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The ACA’s 2017 State Innovation Waiver: 
Is ERISA a Roadblock to Meaningful 
Healthcare Reform? 
Marea B. Tumber 
10 U. MASS. L. REV. 388 
ABSTRACT 
In 2017, the Affordable Care Act’s (ACA) State Innovation Waiver (§ 1332) will 
enable states to waive many of the ACA’s provisions and to develop their own 
creative solutions to reign in healthcare spending. The Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) was enacted to encourage employers to sponsor 
benefit plans and minimize potential conflicts with existing state laws. Because of 
ERISA, the regulation of employee benefit plans, including health plans, falls 
primarily under federal jurisdiction for about 131 million people. This Note explores 
the ways in which ERISA presents significant roadblocks to meaningful state level 
healthcare reform under § 1332. State laws cannot directly refer to ERISA, nor 
influence the benefits, administration, or structure of an ERISA plan. Also, if a state 
law limits employer choices too much, it will likely violate ERISA. This Note 
proposes that ERISA needs to be waived, amended or repealed so that states can 
implement meaningful healthcare reforms under § 1332. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
he Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) was signed 
into law in 2010.
1
 The aims of the ACA are to reduce the number 
of uninsured individuals in the United States, to reign in rising 
healthcare costs, and to improve healthcare quality.
2
 In 2017, the 
ACA’s State Innovation Waiver (§ 1332) will enable states to waive 
many of the ACA’s provisions and to create their own innovative 
solutions to control healthcare spending.
3
 However, the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)
4
 presents a number 
of significant legal hurdles to true innovation in healthcare. ERISA’s 
original purpose was to encourage employers to sponsor benefit plans 
and minimize potential conflicts with existing state laws.
5
 Because of 
ERISA, the regulation of employee benefit plans, including health 
plans, falls primarily under federal jurisdiction for the forty-eight 
percent of the U.S. population insured through their employers.
6
 State 
laws cannot directly refer to ERISA, nor influence the benefits, 
administration, or structure of an ERISA plan.
7
 Also, if a state law 
limits employer choices too much, it will likely violate ERISA.
8
 
The most aggressive innovation in combating high healthcare costs 
is the implementation of a single-payer health insurance system.
9
 
                                                        
1
 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 
(March 23, 2010) as amended by the Healthcare and Education Reconciliation 
Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152 (March 30, 2010) (hereinafter “ACA”). 
2
 See id.; Reform Overview: Summary of the Health Reform Legislation, HEALTH 
REFORM GPS, http://healthreformgps.org/summary-of-the-legislation/ (last 
visited Dec. 20, 2014). 
3
 ACA § 1332, 42 U.S.C. § 18052 (2012). 
4
 Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, Pub. L. 93-406, 
88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1453; Pub. L. 




 Health Insurance Coverage of the Total Population, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., 
http://kff.org/other/state-indicator/total-population/ (last visited March 5, 2015) 
(stating that the breakdown of health insurance by source is as follows: 
employer (48%), Medicaid (16%), Medicare (15%), other public (2%), other 
private (6%)) (hereinafter “Health Insurance Coverage”). 
7
 ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2012); N.Y. State Conference of Blue 
Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 658 (1995). 
8
 Travelers, 514 U.S. at 659. 
9
 See infra note 84. 
T 
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However, in order to comply with ERISA, states would need to leave 
the employer-based health insurance market intact, which stymies true 
healthcare reform.
10
 Any innovation that is too coercive and leaves 
employers with little choice but to modify their plans, or requires that 
an ERISA plan be administered in a specific way or through a single 
processor, would likely violate ERISA.
11
 Additionally, under § 1332, 
state statutes will be required to provide that employers offer coverage 
that is as “comprehensive” as is offered under the ACA.
12
 These 
mandated benefits would also violate ERISA.
13
 This Note explores the 
ways in which ERISA is a significant legal roadblock to meaningful 
state-level healthcare reform under the ACA’s 2017 State Innovation 
Waiver. In order for states to truly innovate and reform their healthcare 
systems under § 1332, ERISA needs to be waived, amended, or 
repealed by Congress, or overridden by executive order. 
This Note begins with an overview of the ACA in Part II, and 
describes the ACA’s 2017 State Innovation Waiver (§ 1332) in Part 
III. Part IV provides a background of ERISA and analyzes how the 
courts have interpreted the law. Part V analyzes how the courts may 
interpret new state laws and their interaction with ERISA under the 
§ 1332 waiver. Finally, Part VI proposes several solutions to the 
preemption issues that will likely arise under states’ laws and ERISA. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Pre-ACA: The Uninsured and Rising Healthcare Costs 
Before the ACA, approximately 16.3 percent of the United States’ 
population lacked health insurance; this translates to approximately 
49.9 million people who were uninsured, with another 25 million who 
were underinsured.
14
 A lack of health insurance has adverse effects on 
an individual’s health due to a lack of preventive care and delays in 
                                                        
10
 William C. Hsiao et al., What Other States Can Learn From Vermont’s Bold 
Experiment: Embracing A Single-Payer Health Care Financing System, 30 
HEALTH AFFAIRS 1232, 1233-34 (2011). 
11
 See infra Part V. 
12
 ACA § 1332, 42 U.S.C. § 18052(b)(1)(A)-(D) (2012). 
13
 Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85, 100 (1983). 
14
 Health Insurance – Highlights-2010, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census
.gov/hhes/www/Hlthins/data/incpovhlth/2010/highlights.html (last visited Feb. 
9, 2015). 
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accessing care when it is needed. These factors lead to higher-cost 
treatments, poorer prognoses, and cost-shifting in the form of higher 




Health spending per capita in the United States is much higher than 
in other countries—at least fifty-one percent higher than in Norway, 
the next largest per capita spender.
16
 In the United States, which has 
both a high level of healthcare spending per capita and a relatively 
high rate of real growth in spending, the share of Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) devoted to healthcare spending grew from nine percent 
of GDP in 1980 to sixteen percent of GDP in 2008.
17
 Healthcare costs 
are increasing at a faster rate than inflation.
18
 Actuaries project that 
healthcare spending will grow an average of 5.8 percent per year 
between 2012 and 2022.
19
 By 2022, annual healthcare spending will 
reach $2.4 trillion, or 19.9 percent of U.S. GDP,
20
 and it is projected 
that federal, state, and local governments will finance forty-nine 
percent of total healthcare spending.
21
 
B. Overview of the ACA 
President Obama signed the ACA into law in 2010, signaling the 
beginning of a nationwide effort to reform our healthcare system.
22
 
The ACA was created to address three important goals: to reduce the 
                                                        
15
 SARAH AXEEN & ELIZABETH CARPENTER, NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION, WHO 
RECEIVES UNCOMPENSATED CARE? 1 (2008); see JOHN HOLAHAN & BOWNE 
GARRETT, URBAN INSTITUTE, THE COST OF UNCOMPENSATED CARE WITH AND 
WITHOUT HEALTH REFORM (2010); see MELISSA MAJEROL, VANN NEWKIRK & 
RACHEL GARFIELD, KAISER FAMILY FOUND, THE UNINSURED: A PRIMER - KEY 
FACTS ABOUT HEALTH INSURANCE AND THE UNINSURED IN AMERICA (2015). 
16
 Snapshots: Healthcare Spending in the United States & Selected 
OECD Countries, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., http://kff.org/health-costs/issue-
brief/snapshots-health-care-spending-in-the-united-states-selected-oecd-










 Gigi A. Cuckler et al., National Health Expenditure Projections, 2012–22: Slow 
Growth Until Coverage Expands And Economy Improves, 32 HEALTH AFFAIRS 
1820, 1830 (2013). 
22
 ACA, 124 Stat. 119. 
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1. Expanding Health Insurance Coverage 
The first aim of the ACA is to provide affordable health insurance 
to the uninsured.
24
 This is a critical component in controlling the cost 
of healthcare because healthcare for the uninsured is extremely 
expensive. As described in Part II (A), a lack of health insurance 
increases the overall cost of healthcare.
25
 In order to reduce the 
number of uninsured, the ACA uses the following strategies: the 
individual mandate, federal monies to subsidize the cost of insurance, 
and the removal of barriers to obtaining insurance.
26
 
 Beginning in 2014, the ACA mandates that most individuals have 
“minimum essential coverage” health insurance
27
 or pay a tax 
penalty.
28
 Employers with at least fifty full-time employees are 
                                                        
23
 See id.; HEALTH REFORM GPS, supra note 2. 
24
 The overall approach of the ACA is to expand access to coverage, and it 
requires most U.S. citizens and legal residents to have health insurance. The 
ACA creates state-based American Health Benefit Exchanges through which 
individuals can purchase coverage, with premium and cost-sharing credits 
available to individuals/families with income between 133-400% of the federal 
poverty level (the poverty level was $19,530 for a family of three in 2013) and 
creates separate Exchanges through which small businesses can purchase 
coverage. The ACA requires employers to pay penalties for employees who 
receive tax credits for health insurance through an Exchange, with exceptions 
for small employers. The ACA imposes new regulations on health plans in the 
Exchanges and in the individual and small group markets. The ACA also 
expands Medicaid to 133% of the federal poverty level. KAISER FAMILY 
FOUND., FOCUS ON HEALTH REFORM, SUMMARY OF THE AFFORDABLE 
CARE ACT 1 (2013). 
25
 See supra note 14. 
26
 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), Key Features of the 
Affordable Care Act By Year, http://www.hhs.gov/healthcare/facts/timeline
/timeline-text.html (last visited March 5, 2015). 
27
 42 U.S.C. § 18091 (2012); 26 U.S.C. § 5000(A) (2012) (requiring all people to 
be covered by health insurance that provides at least “minimum essential 
coverage”). 
28
 The ACA requires U.S. citizens and legal residents to have qualifying health 
coverage. “Those without coverage pay a tax penalty of the greater of $695 per 
year up to a maximum of three times that amount ($2,085) per family or 2.5% of 
household income. The penalty will be phased-in according to the following 
schedule: a flat fee of $95 in 2014, $325 in 2015, and $695 in 2016 or 1.0% of 
taxable income in 2014, 2.0% of taxable income in 2015, and 2.5% of taxable 
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required to either offer minimum health coverage to full-time 
employees and their dependent children, or pay a fine.
29
 The ACA also 
provides federal money in the form of a premium tax credit for people 
with incomes between 100 and 400 percent of the federal poverty level 
(FPL),
30
 as well as to employers with no more than twenty-five full-
time employees, in order to encourage the purchase of insurance.
31
 
                                                                                                                                   
income in 2016. After 2016, the penalty will be increased annually by the cost-
of-living adjustment. Exemptions will be granted for financial hardship, 
religious objections, American Indians, those without coverage for less than 
three months, undocumented immigrants, incarcerated individuals, those for 
whom the lowest cost plan option exceeds 8% of an individual’s income, and 
those with incomes below the tax filing threshold (in 2009 the threshold for 
taxpayers under age 65 was $9,350 for singles and $18,700 for couples).” 
KAISER FAMILY FOUND., supra note 24, at 1. 
29
 29 U.S.C. §§ 218(a-b) (2012); 26 U.S.C. § 4980H (2012). As of January 1, 
2014, the ACA “will assess employers with 50 or more full-time employees that 
do not offer coverage and have at least one full-time employee who receives a 
premium tax credit a fee of $2,000 per full-time employee, excluding the first 30 
employees from the assessment. Employers with 50 or more full-time 
employees that offer coverage but have at least one full-time employee receiving 
a premium tax credit, will pay the lesser of $3,000 for each employee receiving 
a premium credit or $2,000 for each full-time employee, excluding the first 30 
employees from the assessment.” KAISER FAMILY FOUND., supra note 24, at 1. 
30
 26 U.S.C. § 36B (2012). As of January 1, 2014, the ACA provides “refundable 
and advanceable premium credits to eligible individuals and families with 
incomes between 100-400% of the Federal Poverty Limit (FPL) to purchase 
insurance through the Exchanges. The premium credits will be tied to the second 
lowest cost silver plan in the area and will be set on a sliding scale such that the 
premium contributions are limited to the following percentages of income for 
specified income levels: Up to 133% FPL: 2% of income; 133-150% FPL: 3-4% 
of income; 150-200% FPL: 4-6.3% of income; 200-250% FPL: 6.3-8.05% of 
income; 250-300% FPL: 8.05-9.5% of income; 300-400% FPL: 9.5% of income. 
The premium contributions for those receiving subsidies will increase annually 
to reflect the excess of the premium growth over the rate of income growth for 
2014-2018. Beginning in 2019, the ACA will further adjust the premium 
contributions to reflect the excess of premium growth over CPI if aggregate 
premiums and cost sharing subsidies exceed 0.54% of [Gross Domestic Product] 
GDP.” KAISER FAMILY FOUND., supra note 24, at 2. 
31
 26 U.S.C. § 45R (2012). The ACA provides “small employers with no more 
than 25 employees and average annual wages of less than $50,000 that purchase 
health insurance for employees with a tax credit. Phase I: For tax years 2010 
through 2013, the ACA provides a tax credit of up to 35% of the employer’s 
contribution toward employee’s health insurance premium if the employer 
contributes at least 50% of the total premium cost or 50% of a benchmark 
premium. The full credit will be available to employers with 10 or fewer 
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Additionally, in order to cover people who cannot afford health 
insurance, the ACA gives states an option to expand previous 
Medicaid eligibility and provides federal funding to all children, 
pregnant women, parents, and adults (who are under age 65 without 
dependent children) at an income level below 133 percent of the 
FPL.
32
 Approximately 20 million Americans have gained health 
                                                                                                                                   
employees and average annual wages of less than $25,000. The credit phases-
out as firm size and average wage increases. Tax-exempt small businesses 
meeting these requirements are eligible for tax credits of up to 25% of the 
employer’s contribution toward employee’s health insurance premiums. Phase 
II: For tax years 2014 and later, for eligible small businesses that purchase 
coverage through the state Exchange, the ACA provides a tax credit of up to 
50% of the employer’s contribution toward employee’s health insurance 
premiums if the employer contributes at least 50% of the total premium cost. 
The credit will be available for two years. The full credit will be available to 
employers with 10 or fewer employees and average annual wages of less than 
$25,000. The credit phases-out as firm size and average wage increases. Tax-
exempt small businesses meeting these requirements are eligible for tax credits 
of up to 35% of the employer’s contribution toward employee’s health insurance 
premium.” KAISER FAMILY FOUND., supra note 24, at 3. 
32
 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(VIII) (2012). Effective January 1, 2014, the ACA 
expands Medicaid “to all non-Medicare eligible individuals under age 65 
(children, pregnant women, parents, and adults without dependent children) with 
incomes up to 133% FPL based on modified adjusted gross income (as under 
current law undocumented immigrants are not eligible for Medicaid). All newly 
eligible adults will be guaranteed a benchmark benefit package that meets the 
essential health benefits (EHBs) available through the Exchanges. The Supreme 
Court ruling on the constitutionality of the ACA upheld the Medicaid expansion, 
but limited the ability of HHS to enforce it, thereby making the decision to 
expand Medicaid optional for states. To finance the coverage for the newly 
eligible (those who were not previously eligible for at least benchmark 
equivalent coverage, those who were eligible for a capped program but were not 
enrolled, or those who were enrolled in state-funded programs), states will 
receive 100% federal funding for 2014 through 2016, 95% federal financing in 
2017, 94% federal financing in 2018, 93% federal financing in 2019, and 90% 
federal financing for 2020 and subsequent years. States that have already 
expanded eligibility to adults with incomes up to 100% FPL will receive a 
phased-in increase in the federal medical assistance percentage (FMAP) for non-
pregnant childless adults so that by 2019 they receive the same federal financing 
as other states (93% in 2019 and 90% in 2020 and later). States have the option 
to expand Medicaid eligibility to childless adults beginning on April 1, 2010, but 
will receive their regular FMAP until 2014. In addition, the ACA will increase 
Medicaid payments in fee-for-service and managed care for primary care 
services provided by primary care doctors (family medicine, general internal 
medicine or pediatric medicine) to 100% of the Medicare payment rates for 
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insurance coverage since the major coverage provisions of the ACA 
went into effect in January 2014.
33
 The percentage of uninsured 
Americans dropped from 18 percent in the third quarter 2013 to 13.4 
percent in May 2014.
34
 
Another option available to states to increase access to health 
insurance is contained in § 1331 of the ACA.
35
 Section 1331 allows 
states to create a Basic Health Program (BHP) for low-income 
residents who are not eligible for Medicaid and would otherwise be 
eligible to purchase coverage through the exchanges.
36
 Under § 1331, 
benefits must include at least the ten “essential health benefits 
(EHBs),” specified in the ACA.
37
 The BHP option gives states the 
ability to expand affordable coverage for these low-income residents 
and improve continuity of care for people whose income fluctuates 
above and below Medicaid and Children’s Health Insurance Program 
(CHIP) levels.
38
 Minnesota was the first state to implement the BHP, 
with coverage beginning January 1, 2015.
39
 
                                                                                                                                   
2013 and 2014. States will receive 100% federal financing for the increased 
payment rates.” KAISER FAMILY FOUND., supra note 24, at 1-2. 
33
 David Blumenthal & Sara Collins, Healthcare Coverage Under the Affordable 




 ACA § 1331, 42 U.S.C. § 18051 (2012). 
36
 42 U.S.C. § 18051(a) (2012). 
37
 42 U.S.C. § 18051(a)(2)(b) (2012). 
38
 42 U.S.C. § 18051 (2012); The BHP enables states to provide coverage to 
individuals who are citizens or lawfully present non-citizens who do not qualify 
for Medicaid, CHIP, or other minimum essential coverage and have income 
between 133-200 %of the FPL. A state that operates a BHP will receive federal 
funding equal to 95% of the amount of the premium tax credits and the cost 
sharing reductions that would have otherwise been provided to or on behalf of 
eligible individuals if these individuals enrolled in qualified health plans on an 
exchange. Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), Medicaid.gov, 
Keeping America Healthy, Basic Health Program, http://www.medicaid.gov
/Basic-Health-Program/Basic-Health-Program.html (last visited April 9, 2015). 
39
 CMS, supra note 38. 
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2. Controlling Costs and Improving Quality Under the ACA 
The ACA uses an insurance exchange mechanism as its primary 
means to control costs.
40
 Coverage through the “Exchanges,” or 
“Marketplaces,” began in every state on January 1, 2014.
41
 The 
exchanges seek to stimulate competition between insurers by enabling 
consumers to make an informed decision while choosing between 
insurance plans listed in the exchange.
42
 The exchanges simplify the 
comparison of prices and benefits structure by categorizing benefit 
packages,
43
 and brokers are employed to help people select appropriate 
plans.
44
 Also, since the exchanges only allow plans covering the 
EHBs, minimum quality standards across plans are guaranteed.
45
 
Beginning in 2014, the ACA requires non-grandfathered health plans 
to cover the EHBs, which include items and services in the following 
ten benefit categories: (1) ambulatory patient services; (2) emergency 
services; (3) hospitalization; (4) maternity and newborn care; (5) 
mental health and substance use disorder services, including 
behavioral health treatment; (6) prescription drugs; (7) rehabilitative 
and habilitative services and devices; (8) laboratory services; (9) 
preventive and wellness services and chronic disease management; and 
(10) pediatric services, including oral and vision care.
46
 The EHBs 
should be equal in scope to a typical employer health plan.
47
 
                                                        
40
 TIMOTHY S. JOST, The COMMONWEALTH FUND, HEALTH INSURANCE 
EXCHANGES AND THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT: KEY POLICY ISSUES v-vi, 28-29 
(2010). 
41
 42 U.S.C. § 18031(b) (2012); Rachel Brand, Facing the Future: Setting up 
Health Insurance Exchanges is One of the Big, Early Tasks for Lawmakers, 
NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, Oct./Nov. 2010, at 24. 
42
 Brand, supra note 41, at 25. 
43
 42 U.S.C. §§ 18022(d)-(e) (2012) (outlining that exchange plans should be 
categorized in one of the five following groups according to their actuarial 
value: bronze level with 60% actuarial value, silver level with 70%, gold level 
with 80%, platinum level with 90%, or a catastrophic plan covering only serious 
medical emergencies). 
44
 See JOST, supra note 40, at 26. 
45
 ALAN WEIL, ADI SHAFIR & SARABETH ZEMEL, NAT’L ACADEMY FOR STATE 
HEALTH POLICY, HEALTH INSURANCE EXCHANGE BASICS 2-3 (2011). 
46
 42 U.S.C. §§ 18022(b)(1)(A-J) (2012). 
47
 42 U.S.C. § 18022(b)(2)(A) (2012). (“The Secretary [of HHS] shall ensure that 
the scope of the EHBs under paragraph (1) is equal to the scope of benefits 
provided under a typical employer plan, as determined by the Secretary. To 
inform this determination, the Secretary of Labor shall conduct a survey of 
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States may elect to build a fully state-based marketplace, enter into 
a state-federal partnership marketplace, or default to a federally-
facilitated marketplace.
48
 The ACA directs the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services (HHS) to establish and operate a federally-facilitated 
marketplace in any state that is not able or willing to establish a state-
based exchange.
49
 In 2014, the federal government provided $1 
million in funding to each state that elected to set up a state-based 
exchange.
50
 The exchanges are expected to help reduce healthcare 
costs by, among other things, preventing excessive adverse selection 
(the disproportionate purchase of health insurance by unhealthy 
individuals), reducing administrative expenses, promoting 
competition, and enabling comparative shopping.
51
 The ACA prohibits 
insurers from rejecting applicants or requiring high premiums based on 
factors other than whether such plan covers an individual or family, 
age, geographic area, or use of tobacco.
52
 The ACA also limits cost 
burdens on the insured by prohibiting insurers from sharing more than 
a certain amount of the cost with patients,
53
 and sets up a national 
                                                                                                                                   
employer-sponsored coverage to determine the benefits typically covered by 
employers, including multiemployer plans, and provide a report on such survey 
to the Secretary.”); Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Center for 
Consumer Information and Insurance Oversight, Additional Information on 
State Essential Health Benefits Benchmark Plans, http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO
/Resources/Data-Resources/ehb.html (last visited Dec. 27, 2014). 
48
 Kaiser Family Found., Establishing Health Insurance Marketplaces: An 
Overview of State Efforts, http://kff.org/health-reform/issue-brief/establishing-
health-insurance-exchanges-an-overview-of/ (last visited Dec. 31, 2014). 
49
 42 U.S.C. § 18041(c) (2012). 
50
 42 U.S.C. § 18024(a)(1) (2012); see also HHS Announces State Insurance 
Exchange Development Grants, HEALTH REFORM GPS, http://www
.healthreformgps.org/resources/hhs-announces-state-insurance-exchange-
development-grants/ (reporting that forty-eight states had received money to 
start building the exchanges for 2014) (last visited Dec. 27, 2014). 
51
 See JOST, supra note 40, at v-vi. 
52
 42 U.S.C. § 300gg(a)(1)(A) (2012); KAISER FAMILY FOUND., HEALTH 
INSURANCE MARKET REFORMS: RATE RESTRICTIONS 3 (2012). 
53
 42 U.S.C. § 18022 (2012). Effective January 1, 2014, the ACA created an EHBs 
package that provides a comprehensive set of services, covers at least 60% of 
the actuarial value of the covered benefits, limits annual cost-sharing to the 
current law Health Savings Account (HSA) limits ($5,950/individual and 
$11,900/family in 2010), and is not more extensive than the typical employer 
plan. The ACA requires all qualified health benefits plans, including those 
offered through the Exchanges and those offered in the individual and small 
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high-risk pool for those with pre-existing medical conditions.
54
 The 
exchanges can also control costs by reducing waste and fraud.
55
 
The United States spends nearly $360 billion per year on 
administrative costs, accounting for fourteen percent of healthcare 
spending.
56
 The ACA will help simplify administrative systems for all 
payers and providers by requiring uniform standards and operating 
rules for electronic transactions between health insurance plans and 
providers, which will curb administrative spending.
57
 Currently, one of 
the primary reasons that administrative costs are excessive is that each 
provider negotiates payment rates with multiple insurers.
58
 
While the ACA mandates minimum quality and cost-control 
mechanisms, it also gives states significant flexibility. There are many 
ways that states can reduce healthcare spending under the provisions 
of the ACA. For example, states can increase alternatives to fee-for-
                                                                                                                                   
group markets outside the Exchanges, except grandfathered individual and 
employer-sponsored plans, to offer at least the EHBs package. KAISER FAMILY 
FOUND., supra note 24, at 6. 
54
 42 U.S.C. § 18001(a) (2012). The ACA establishes a temporary national high-
risk pool to provide health coverage to individuals with pre-existing medical 
conditions. U.S. citizens and legal immigrants who have a pre-existing medical 
condition and who have been uninsured for at least six months will be eligible to 
enroll in the high-risk pool and receive subsidized premiums. Premiums for the 
pool will be established as if for a standard population and not for a population 
with a higher health risk. Premiums may vary by age (by a 4 to 1 ratio), 
geographic area and family composition. Maximum cost-sharing will be limited 
to the current law HSA limit ($5,950/individual and $11,900/family in 2010). 
The ACA appropriates $5 billion to finance the program. KAISER FAMILY 
FOUND., supra note 24, at 6. 
55
 42 U.S.C. § 18001(f)(2) (2012) (authorizing the Secretary of HHS to create 
procedures to protect against waste, fraud, and abuse in high-risk pool context). 
Similar provisions mandating care to be taken in guarding against waste and 
fraud appear throughout the ACA. The ACA will reduce waste, fraud, and abuse 
in public programs by allowing provider screening, enhanced oversight periods 
for new providers and suppliers, and by requiring Medicare and Medicaid 
program providers and suppliers to establish compliance programs. The ACA 
will allow for the development of a database to capture and share data across 
federal and state programs, and increase penalties for submitting false claims, 
strengthen standards for community mental health centers, and increase funding 
for anti-fraud activities. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., supra note 24, at 9. 
56
 Emanuel Ezekiel et al. A Systemic Approach to Containing Healthcare 
Spending, 348 NEW ENG. J. MED. 949, 951 (2012). 
57
 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320(d), (d-2) (2012). 
58
 Ezekiel, supra note 56, at 949. 
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service payments,
59
 and enroll more patients into Accountable Care 
Organizations (ACOs)
60
 and Patient-Centered Medical Homes 
(PCMHs).
61
 If the exchanges engage in active purchasing, they can 
leverage their bargaining power to secure the best premium rates and 
promote reforms in payment and delivery systems.
62
 Also, increasing 
cost transparency would allow consumers to plan ahead and choose 




While these creative solutions under the ACA will likely curb 
healthcare spending, the largest impact that the ACA may have on 
state innovation will be through § 1332, the Waiver for State 
Innovation.
64
 Beginning in 2017, the § 1332 waiver will allow states to 
opt out of many of the ACA’s provisions, and to implement an 
alternative system of their own.
65
 Recognizing that states are 
                                                        
59
 A fee-for-service payment system encourages wasteful use of high-cost tests and 
procedures. Instead of paying a fee for each service, payers could pay a fixed 
amount to physicians and hospitals for a bundle of services (bundled payments) 
or for all the care that a patient needs (global payments). Id. at 950. 
60
 An ACO is a network of doctors and hospitals that shares financial and medical 
responsibility for providing coordinated care to patients in hopes of limiting 
unnecessary spending. Jenny Gold, FAQ On ACOs: Accountable Care 
Organizations, Explained, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (April 16, 2014), 
http://kaiserhealthnews.org/news/aco-accountable-care-organization-faq/. 
61
 A PCMH is a team-based healthcare delivery model led by a physician
 
that 
provides comprehensive and continuous medical care to patients with the goal of 
obtaining maximized health outcomes, improving access to healthcare, 
increasing satisfaction with care, and improving health. It is a partnership 
between the patient, family, and primary provider in cooperation with specialists 
and support from the community. The patient/family is the focal point of this 
model, and the medical home is built around this center. Joint principles that 
define a PCMH have been established through the cohesive efforts of the 
American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP), American Academy of Family 
Physicians (AAFP), American College of Physicians (ACP), and American 
Osteopathic Association (AOA). U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS), Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, PCMH Resource 
Center, Defining the PCMH, http://pcmh.ahrq.gov/page/patient-centered-care 
(last visited March 5, 2015). 
62
 Ezekiel, supra note 56, at 951. 
63
 Id. at 951-52. 
64
 42 U.S.C. § 18052 (2012). 
65
 Id. 
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historically more innovative than the federal government, the ACA 
was drafted to use the states as incubators of change.
66
 
III.  OPTING OUT OF THE ACA: THE § 1332 WAIVER 
A state seeking a § 1332 waiver must file an application with the 
Secretary of HHS. The state must propose an alternative system that 
meets the following criteria. The state plan must (1) provide coverage 
that is at least as comprehensive as the ACA,
67
 (2) be at least as 
affordable as the ACA,
68
 (3) provide coverage to at least a comparable 
number of its residents as the ACA,
69
 and (4) be budget-neutral and 
not increase the Federal deficit.
70
 
A state seeking the § 1332 waiver must enact legislation that 
authorizes its waiver application, hold public hearings, and provide for 
a meaningful notice and comment period.
71
 The § 1332 waiver will 
                                                        
66
 See Press Release, The White House, Office Of The Press Sec’y, Fact Sheet: 




 42 U.S.C. § 18052(b)(1)(A) (2012) (“provide coverage that is at least as 
comprehensive as the coverage defined in section 18022(b) of this title [the 
EHBs] and offered through Exchanges established under this title...”); JESSICA 
SCHUBEL & SARAH LUECK, CENTER OF BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, 
UNDERSTANDING THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT’S STATE INNOVATION (“1332”) 
WAIVERS 3-4 (2015) (While coverage must be at least as comprehensive as the 
EHBs, a state may waive the specific EHB requirements. The authors conclude 
that additional federal guidance is needed to fully establish whether certain other 
ACA requirements and standards lie within or outside the scope of § 1332 
waivers). 
68
 42 U.S.C. § 18052(b)(1)(B) (2012) (“provide coverage and cost sharing 
protections against excessive out-of-pocket spending that are at least as 
affordable as the provisions of this title would provide”); see also § 18022(c)(3) 
(explaining that “the term ‘cost-sharing’ includes deductibles, coinsurance, 
copayments, or similar charges; and any other expenditure required of an 
insured individual which is a qualified medical expense”). 
69
 42 U.S.C. § 18052(b)(1)(C) (2012) (“provide coverage to at least a comparable 
number of its residents as the provisions of this title would provide”). 
70
 42 U.S.C. § 18052(a)(1)(B)(ii) (2012) (“application shall...contain...a 10-year 
budget plan for such plan that is budget neutral for the Federal Government”); 
42 U.S.C. § 18052(b)(1)(D) (2012) (the plan “will not increase the Federal 
deficit”). 
71
 31 C.F.R. § 33.100 (a)(1) (2012). 
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also give states the same premium tax credits that they would have 
received if they had an exchange.
72
 
At a minimum, state waiver plans must meet the four criteria listed 
above. However, it is important to note that there are specific 
provisions in the ACA that are not subject to the § 1332 waiver and 
therefore cannot be waived.
73
 Examples of these provisions that are 
not subject to the § 1332 waiver include the ACA’s ban on coverage 
limits in most plans, the requirement to cover certain preventive 
procedures at no charge to enrollees, or the requirement to cover 
dependents up to age twenty-six.
74
 Also, a state cannot use a § 1332 
waiver to eliminate an array of ACA provisions that bar discrimination 




A. Potential State Innovations Under § 1332 
The § 1332 waiver will give states tremendous flexibility. For 
example, states could use the waiver to create a public option.
76
 The 
public option creates a state healthcare plan that competes with private 
insurers, enabling states to experiment with a Medicare-like option 
within the existing exchanges.
77
 Individuals and small businesses 
would be able to buy these plans, just as they would purchase a 
healthcare plan from a private insurance company.
78
 Some federal 
lawmakers pushed for this in 2008 and 2009, during the discussions 
surrounding the ACA.
79
 However, this solution does not directly 
                                                        
72
 42 U.S.C. § 18052 (a)(3) (2012). 
73




 Id. at 4. 
76
 A public option is intended to cover those who do not have health insurance, and 
it is designed to compete with private insurers. The public option that was 
discussed in 2008-2009 during the debates surrounding the ACA was proposed 
as an alternative health insurance plan offered by the government. See Dan Balz 
& Jon Cohen, Most support public option for health insurance, poll finds, 
WASH. POST, Oct. 20, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn
/content/article/2009/10/19/AR2009101902451.html?sid=ST2009101902502; 
JOHN SHEILS & RANDY HAUGHT, THE LEWIN GROUP, THE COST AND COVERAGE 
IMPACTS OF A PUBLIC PLAN: ALTERNATIVE DESIGN OPTIONS 1-2 (2009). 
77




 John E. McDonough, Wyden’s Waiver: State Innovation on Steroids, 39 J. 
HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 1099, 1108 (2014). 
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address people with employer-based health insurance.
80
 Since 
approximately forty-eight percent of the U.S. population is insured 
through their employer, the public option would exclude a large 
portion of the population from the healthcare reform innovation.
81
 
In the U.S. in 2013, approximately six percent of the population 
had private health insurance that was not employer-based.
82
 It is 
possible that a state level reform under § 1332 could focus on this 
population, but the effect on overall costs would be minimal. If a state 
were to experiment with the public option and include both the non-
employer-based insureds and Medicaid recipients, approximately 
twenty-two percent of the population could participate in the 
innovation.
83
 However, in order to reduce healthcare costs 
significantly, meaningful state reform needs to address a much larger 
proportion of the population. 
The most aggressive and comprehensive alternative to combat high 
healthcare costs is “single-payer” health insurance. A single-payer 
system generally refers to a healthcare system where a government 
agent or its designated entity (“single entity”) provides health 
insurance funded with tax dollars and covers all residents with the 
same benefit coverage.
84
 This single entity collects healthcare fees and 
pays all healthcare costs, but is not involved in the delivery of 
healthcare services.
85
 There is one insurance fund that provides 
benefits to consumers and pays providers under uniform mechanisms 
                                                        
80
 Initially, a public option would be available to individuals and the self-
employed. It is not intended to include people with employer-based insurance. 
However, it is possible to implement a public option that is available to all. It is 
also possible that, over time, a public option could be so successful that it could 
crowd private insurers out of the market. See SHEILS, supra note 76, at 2; 
ROBERT E. MOFFIT, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, OBAMACARE AND THE 
HIDDEN PUBLIC OPTION: CROWDING OUT PRIVATE COVERAGE (2011). 
81




 Id. (The 22% estimation is derived from combining the 6% of non-employer-
based insureds with the 16% of Americans who receive Medicaid.). 
84
 See Hsiao, supra note 10, at 1232. 
85
 What is Single Payer?, PHYSICIANS FOR A NAT’L HEALTH PROGRAM (Feb. 9, 
2015, 9:45 AM), http://www.pnhp.org/facts/what-is-single-payer; see also 
WILLIAM C. HSIAO, STEVEN KAPPEL & JONATHAN GRUBER, ACT 128 HEALTH 
SYSTEM REFORM DESIGN: ACHIEVING AFFORDABLE UNIVERSAL HEALTHCARE 
IN VERMONT 10 (Feb. 17, 2011). 
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and rates.
86
 Single-payer systems contrast with our current multiple-
payer system (governments, employers, and individuals), with variable 
payments and benefits packages.
87
 
There are other models of healthcare systems that incorporate 
many of these features. A single-payer system is defined as a health 
insurance system that provides insurance coverage to every resident 
with a standard benefit package.
88
 Most commonly, a single-payer 
system unifies both the mechanisms (e.g. a “payment pipe”) by which 
services are paid for, and the actual payment amounts.
89
 However, a 
“single pipe” is possible even when there are multiple payers and 
payment rates, and all providers send claims to a centralized 
processing center despite the existence of multiple insurance funds.
90
 




Single-payer insurance is distinct from “socialized medicine.” 
Socialized medicine, such as Britain’s National Health Service, or the 
U.S. Veterans Administration system, is a healthcare system in which 
the government owns and operates healthcare facilities and employs 
the healthcare professionals.
92
 In a single-payer system, the payment 
                                                        
86










 For example, in both Germany and Japan, all providers send claims to a 
centralized processing center despite the existence of multiple insurance funds. 
In these countries there is also a uniform rate schedule, but it is also possible to 
have a single pipe for paying providers with multiple benefit packages and 
multiple rate schedules negotiated between different payers and provider groups. 
The authors modeled two types of single-payers systems. The first is a single 
pipe system, similar to that of Germany and Japan, in which different insurance 
plans channel all of their claim payments through one central organization. This 
can be seen in what they define as the Public Option, Option 2. The authors also 
modeled a more traditional system for Options 1 and 3, where there is just one 
insurance fund, and all payments, including those of Medicare, Medicaid and 
Worker’s Compensation medical claims, are paid using the same rates, payment 
methods and claim payment adjudication rules. Id. 
92
 Uwe E. Reinhardt, Where ‘Socialized Medicine’ Has a U.S. Foothold, 
ECONOMIX BLOGS N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2012, 6:00 AM), http://economix.blogs
.nytimes.com/2012/08/03/where-socialized-medicine-has-a-u-s-
foothold/?ref=business. 
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and delivery systems are separate, and providers are not government 
employees.
93
 The term “single-payer” describes the funding 
mechanism and does not specify the type of delivery, or for whom 
doctors work.
94
 Medicare is an example of a mostly single-payer 
system, as is France’s healthcare system; both of these systems have 




Several states are considering applying for the § 1332 waiver and 
implementing a single-payer system; however, Vermont has made the 
most progress in establishing the first state-level single-payer system 
in the nation.
96
 In 2010, Vermont’s Legislature commissioned a team 
of experts to produce a report on the viability of a single-payer 
system.
97
 In that report, the authors estimated that after ten years, the 
single-payer system would reduce healthcare spending by 25.3 percent 
compared to what spending would be without reform.
98
 The sources of 
savings include the following: administrative expenses (7.3%), 
reduced fraud and abuse (5%), payment reform and integration of 
delivery systems (10%), malpractice reform (2%), and governance and 
administration (1%).
99
 In 2011, Vermont’s legislature passed Act 128 
that established Green Mountain Care, which is a state-funded-and-
managed insurance pool that would provide near-universal coverage to 
residents with the expectation that it would reduce healthcare 
spending.
100
 Thus, Act 128 functionally established the first state-level 
single-payer healthcare system in the United States.
101
 
                                                        
93
 See id.; Ezra Klein, Health Reform for Beginners: The Difference Between 
Socialized Medicine, Single-Payer Healthcare, and What We’ll Be Getting, 
WASH. POST (June 9, 2009, 11:09 AM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com
/ezraklein/2009/06/health_reform_for_beginners_th_1.htmlreform_for
_beginners_th_1.html; HSIAO, supra note 85, at 35-36. 
94
 See Klein, supra note 93; see HSIAO, supra note 85, at 35-36. 
95
 See Klein, supra note 93. 
96
 Kimberly Min, Waiver For State Innovation: A Call For Increased Success Or 
A Projected Failure?, 26 HEALTH LAWYER 32, 34-35 (2013). 
97
 Hsiao, supra note 10, at 1232-33. 
98




 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 9371 (2011). 
101
 Id.; PRIMARY CARE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, COMMUNITY HEALTH 
CENTER GROWTH AND SUSTAINABILITY STATE PROFILES: VERMONT VT-2 
(2014). (“In 2011, the Vermont state government enacted a law functionally 
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However, on December 17, 2014, Governor Shumlin announced 
that he was abandoning Vermont’s single-payer plan because the costs 
were too high.
102
 The Governor stated that the cost of the single-payer 
plan turned out to be “enormous”, requiring an 11.5 percent payroll tax 
on all Vermont businesses and a public premium assessment of up to 
9.5 percent of individual Vermonters’ income.
103
 However, these 
numbers are actually less than the 12.8 to 18.2 percent payroll taxes 
estimated by the authors in the 2011 report.
104
 Businesses did make it 
clear to Shumlin that they did not want to pay for the single-payer plan 
while maintaining their own employee health plans.
105
 Large 
companies, particularly the self-insured, threatened to leave the state 
rather than pay the payroll tax.
106
 Although Vermont’s current effort to 
establish a single-payer system failed, the lessons learned through their 
                                                                                                                                   
establishing the first state-level single-payer health care system in the United 
States. Green Mountain Care creates a system in the state designed to provide 
universal health care coverage. The legislation will not be fully implemented 
until 2017, and up to that point, Vermont will continue with provisions of the 
Affordable Care Act.”); see Jessica Marcy, Vermont Edges Toward Single Payer 
Health Care, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (October 2, 2011), http://kaiserhealthnews
.org/news/vermont-single-payer-health-care/ (“Starting now, Vermont begins 
building a single-payer health system that will move many state residents into a 
publicly financed insurance program and pay hospitals, doctors and other 
providers a set fee to care for patients. Proposed by the governor and passed by 
the Democratic-controlled legislature, the new program will replace the 
traditional insurance plans currently used in the state and the traditional fee-for-
service reimbursements, giving the state a system different from its 49 
counterparts and more like its neighbor to the north, Canada.. . .It will be a 
unique endeavor; no other state has tried such a dramatic restructuring of its 
health care system, and national lawmakers backed away from such an option in 
the health care overhaul debate after vehement opposition from conservatives”). 
102
 Sarah Wheaton, Vermont bails on single-payer healthcare, POLITICO (Dec. 17, 
2014, 6:18 PM). http://www.politico.com/story/2014/12/vermont-peter-shumlin-
single-payer-health-care-113653.html#ixzz3N7bAZ7lx. 
103
 Neal P. Goswami, Shumlin scraps single payer plans, RUTLAND HERALD (Dec. 
18, 2014), available at http://www.rutlandherald.com/article/20141218
/NEWS03/712189953/1001/NEWS; see STATE OF VERMONT AGENCY OF 
ADMINISTRATION, GREEN MOUNTAIN CARE: A COMPREHENSIVE MODEL FOR 
BUILDING VERMONT’S UNIVERSAL HEALTH CARE SYSTEM (2014). 
104
 HSIAO, supra note 85, at xviii. 
105
 Wheaton, supra note 102. 
106
 Peter Hirschfeld, Large Employers Grow Wary Of Single-Payer Plan, VT. PUB. 
RADIO (Dec. 10, 2014), http://digital.vpr.net/post/large-employers-grow-wary-
single-payer-plan. 
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efforts may provide useful information for other states considering a 
§ 1332 waiver. 
IV. LEGAL ISSUES: ERISA AND THE § 1332 WAIVER 
Several federal laws could hinder state innovation under the § 1332 
waiver. Medicare, which represents a major federal payer, and 
Medicaid, which is a federal-state partnership, are both potential 
roadblocks to major state innovations like a single-payer system.
107
 
However, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) 
promulgated regulations in 2012 that provide for a coordinated waiver 
process for all federal health laws in the jurisdiction of CMS, HHS and 
the Department of the Treasury (“Treasury”).
 108
 This includes waivers 
associated with Title XVIII (Medicare), Title XIX (Medicaid), and 
Title XXI (CHIP).
109
 Section 1332 does not provide for laws outside of 
the jurisdiction of CMS, HHS, and the Treasury to be waived.
110
 One 
of the federal laws that falls outside of the coordinated waiver process 
is ERISA,
111
 which is likely to be a significant barrier for states 
seeking the § 1332 waiver. 
A. ERISA Overview 
ERISA regulates most of the non-wage benefits that employers 
provide to employees, from retirement savings to welfare benefits, 
including health insurance.
112
 ERISA is extremely relevant to 
healthcare law and policy because approximately half of the U.S. 
                                                        
107
 See Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), Medicaid.gov, Federal 
Policy Guidance, http://medicaid.gov/federal-policy-guidance/federal-policy-
guidance.html (last visited April 12, 2015); see Centers for Medicare & 
Medicaid Services (CMS), History, https://www.cms.gov/About-CMS/Agency-
Information/History/index.html?redirect=/history/ (last visited April 12, 2015). 
108
 42 U.S.C. § 18052 (5) (2012); Waiver for State Innovation, 77 Fed. Reg. 11700, 




 42 U.S.C. § 18052 (c)(2) (2012); Waiver for State Innovation, 77 Fed. Reg. 
11700, 11702 (Feb. 27, 2012) (codified at 31 C.F.R. § 33 & 45 C.F.R. § 155 
(2012)) (The promulgated regulations provide for a coordinated waiver process 
only for all federal health laws in the jurisdiction of CMS, HHS and the 
Treasury. No Federal laws or requirements may be waived that are not within 
the Secretaries’ authority.). 
111
 ERISA, 88 Stat. 829. 
112
 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002, 1003 (2012). 
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population (forty-eight percent) had employer-provided health 
insurance coverage in 2014.
113
 Most importantly, ERISA preempts 
state laws purporting to regulate employee benefits.
114
 This section 
gives an overview of ERISA and relevant case law, and then discusses 
the effect the law has had on healthcare reform. 
The federal government enacted ERISA in 1974 to help protect 
employees’ pension plans against default.
115
 With ERISA, Congress 
aimed to safeguard “participants in employee benefit plans and their 
beneficiaries, by . . . establishing standards of conduct, responsibility, 
and obligation for fiduciaries of employee benefit plans, and by 
providing for appropriate remedies, sanctions, and . . . access to the 
Federal courts.”
116
 Pensions were the focus of the law at the time of 
ERISA’s enactment, but ERISA also addresses welfare plans, which 
include employer-provided healthcare plans.
117
 The goals of ERISA 
were to protect employee benefit plan participants by federalizing the 
regulation of plan administration and reducing potentially conflicting 
                                                        
113
 Health Insurance Coverage, supra note 6. 
114
 Shaw, 463 U.S. at 106; ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2012). 
115
 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a)-(c) (2012). (“The Congress finds that the growth in size, 
scope, and numbers of employee benefit plans in recent years has been rapid and 
substantial; that the operational scope and economic impact of such plans is [sic] 
increasingly interstate; that the continued well-being and security of millions of 
employees and their dependents are directly affected by these plans; that they 
are affected with a national public interest. . .that owing to the lack of employee 
information and adequate safeguards concerning their operation, it is desirable 
in the interests of employees and their beneficiaries, and to provide for the 
general welfare and the free flow of commerce, that disclosure be made and 
safeguards be provided with respect to the establishment, operation, and 
administration of such plans; that they substantially affect the revenues of the 
United States because they are afforded preferential Federal tax treatment; that 
despite the enormous growth in such plans many employees with long years of 
employment are losing anticipated retirement benefits owing to the lack of 
vesting provisions in such plans; that owing to the inadequacy of current 
minimum standards, the soundness and stability of plans with respect to 
adequate funds to pay promised benefits may be endangered; that owing to the 
termination of plans before requisite funds have been accumulated, employees 
and their beneficiaries have been deprived of anticipated benefits; and that it is 
therefore desirable in the interests of employees and their beneficiaries, for the 
protection of the revenue of the United States, and to provide for the free flow of 
commerce, that minimum standards be provided assuring the equitable character 
of such plans and their financial soundness.”). 
116
 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (2012). 
117
 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (2012). 
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state laws, and to simplify the process for large companies trying to 
administer benefit plans in multiple states.
118
 
Because of ERISA, the regulation of employee benefit plans, 
including health plans, falls primarily under federal jurisdiction for 
about 131 million people.
119
 A health benefit plan is covered by 
ERISA only if it is “established or maintained by an employer or by an 
employee organization.”
120
 ERISA’s definition of what constitutes an 
employee benefit plan is broad. Employee welfare benefit plans 
subject to ERISA’s provisions are defined as any plan or fund intended 
to provide “medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or benefits 




1. ERISA’s Preemption and Savings Clauses 
Under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, a state law 
is “preempted” and unenforceable when it is inconsistent with a 
federal law.
122
 Section 514(a) states that ERISA supersedes any state 
laws “related to” an ERISA plan and may preempt a state law “if it has 
a connection with or reference to [an ERISA] plan.”
123
 This phrase is 
commonly referred to as ERISA’s “preemption clause.” The 
preemption clause encourages employers to sponsor employee benefit 
plans and allows employer-sponsored benefit plans to operate 
independently of potentially differing state laws.
124
 ERISA even 
preempts state laws that are consistent with the ERISA requirements 
                                                        
118
 See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2012). 
119
 Hinda Ripps Chaikind, ERISA Regulation of Health Plans: Fact Sheet, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., 1 (March 6, 2003), available at http://www.allhealth.org
/briefingmaterials/erisaregulationofhealthplans-114.pdf. 
120
 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (2012). 
121
 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1)(A) (2012). 
122
 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1578 (9
th
 ed. 2009); see U.S. CONST. Art. VI, cl. 2. 
123
 ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2012); see District of Columbia v. 
Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 129 (1992). 
124
 Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 142 (1990). (“Section 514(a) 
was intended to ensure that plans and plan sponsors would be subject to a 
uniform body of benefits law; the goal was to minimize the administrative and 
financial burden of complying with conflicting directives among States or 
between States and the Federal Government.”). 
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However, there are a significant number of plans that ERISA does 
not regulate. ERISA regulates only private employer benefit plans, not 
government plans, church plans, or those purchased by individuals.
126
 
Public health insurance programs, which are programs administered by 
or through public agencies, are also not within ERISA’s scope because 
they are not provided or administered by an employer.
127
 
Section 514(b)(2) contains ERISA’s “savings” and “deemer” 
clauses.
128
 ERISA contains provisions that save for the states the 
general authority to regulate insurance (“savings clause”), but also 
dictates that states cannot claim that employer-sponsored plans are 
insurance plans solely for the purpose of regulating them (“deemer 
clause”).
129
 ERISA preemption is limited by an exception permitting 
states to enforce general insurance, banking, or securities regulation 
against employee benefit plans.
130
 Pursuant to the McCarran-Ferguson 
Act of 1945, states retain the authority to regulate “the business of 
insurance.”
131
 This authority appears to give states leeway to regulate 
the conduct of health insurance companies, but not to be involved with 




                                                        
125
 N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v.Travelers Ins. Co., 
514 U.S. 645, 655 (1995). (The Supreme Court limited this potentially 
expansive preemption of state law by noting that courts must presume that 
ERISA is not intended to supplant police powers unless explicitly stated.). 
126
 29 U.S.C. § 1003 (2012). 
127
 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(1) (2012), citing 29 U.S.C. § 1002(32) (2012). 
128
 ERISA § 514(b)(2)(A) (2012), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1144(b)(2)(A)(B) (2012); see 
Edward Alburo Morrissey, Deem and Deemer: ERISA Preemption Under the 
Deemer Clause As Applied to Employer Health Care Plans with Stop-Loss 
Insurance, 23 J. LEGIS. 307, 308-10 (1997). 
129
 ERISA § 514(b)(2)(A) (2012), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1144(b)(2)(A)(B) (2012); see 
Morrissey, supra note 128, at 308-10. 
130
 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (2012). 
131
 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (2012). 
132
 PATRICIA A. BUTLER, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND.’S STATE COVERAGE 
INITIATIVES AND THE NAT’L ACAD. FOR STATE HEALTH POLICY, INCLUDING 
EMPLOYER FINANCING IN STATE HEALTH REFORM INITIATIVES: IMPLICATIONS 
OF RECENT COURT DECISIONS 1,4 (2009). 
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States do not have the power to enforce laws regulating insurance 
against self-insured health benefit plans, a subset of ERISA plans 
where the employer bears the risk of higher costs.
133
  
ERISA is the only regulator for self-insured plans, whereas both 
ERISA and state insurance laws govern plans that are purchased by a 
third-party.
134
 When ERISA was enacted, only about seven percent of 
covered workers were in self-insured plans; by 2011, approximately 
fifty-eight percent of workers under ERISA’s jurisdiction were 
covered by self-insured plans, and therefore were beyond the reach of 
state insurance regulators.
135
 This means that employer-provided 
health plans are potentially covered by ERISA and state insurance 
regulation, while self-insured plans are subject only to ERISA. 
B. Judicial Interpretation of ERISA 
Court decisions largely define the limitations of ERISA’s 
preemption and savings clauses. The Supreme Court has held that it 
would not presume that Congress intended ERISA to preempt laws in 
areas of traditional state authority.
136
 In so holding, the Court reasoned 
that in passing § 514(a), Congress intended to ensure that plans and 
plan sponsors would be subject to a uniform body of benefits law.
137
 
The goals of the legislation were to minimize the administrative and 
financial burdens of complying with conflicting directives among 
States or between States and the Federal Government, and to prevent 
the potential for conflict in substantive law requiring the tailoring of 
plans and employer conduct to the peculiarities of the law of each 
jurisdiction.
138
 The basic thrust of the preemption clause was to avoid 
a multiplicity of regulation in order to permit the nationally uniform 
                                                        
133
 J. R. Gabel, Job-Based Health Insurance, 1977-1998: The Accidental System 
Under Scrutiny, HEALTH AFFAIRS 62, 70 (1999). 
134
 HSIAO, supra note 85, at 8. 
135
 Gabel, supra note 133, at 70; Employee Benefit Research Institute, Self-Insured 
Health Plans: State Variation and Recent Trends by Firm Size, http://www.ebri
.org/publications/notes/index.cfm?fa=notesDisp&content_id=5131 (last visited 
April 12, 2015). 
136
 N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 
514 U.S. 645, 654-55 (1995). 
137
 Id. at 656 (citing Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 142 (1990)). 
138
 See id. 
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administration of employee benefit plans.
139
 Currently, the Court uses 
a two-part test for ERISA preemption: a state law will be preempted if 
it (1) “refers” to an ERISA plan, or (2) “relates to” an ERISA plan by 
substantially affecting its benefits, administration or structure.
140
 
1. “Reference to” an Employee Benefit plan 
State laws are preempted by ERISA if the law has a “reference to” 
an employee benefit plan.
141
 Where a state’s law acts immediately and 
exclusively upon ERISA plans, or where the existence of ERISA plans 




In Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Service, Inc., the Court 
held that a state law “references” an employee benefit plan if it singles 
out that plan for different treatment.
143
 The Court stated that an 
“employee benefit plan or program subject to the provisions of 
[ERISA] . . . shall not be subject to the process of garnishment . . . 
unless such garnishment is based upon a judgment for alimony or for 
child support.”
144
 The law at issue here applied only to ERISA plans 
and had an immediate effect on such plans, and as a result, it was held 
preempted on the grounds that it contained an impermissible reference 
to an ERISA plan.
145
 
The Court has also found a “reference to” an ERISA plan where 
the existence of ERISA plans are essential to a law’s operation.
146
 
There are two Supreme Court cases that have interpreted the “essential 
to the operation” standard. In District of Columbia (D.C.) v. Greater 
Wash. Bd. of Trade, the existence of ERISA plans was held to be 
“essential to the operation” because the D.C. law required that benefits 
for injured employees be set by reference to the terms of existing 
                                                        
139
 Shaw v. Delta Airlines, 463 U.S. 85, 98-100 (1983) (reviewing the legislative 
history of ERISA’s preemption provision). 
140
 BUTLER, supra note 132, at 4. 
141
 Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96-97. 
142
 Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., Inc., 
519 U.S. 316, 325 (1997). 
143
 Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Service, Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 829-30 
(1988). 
144
 Id. at 828 n.2 (quoting Ga. Code Ann. § 18-4-22.1 (1982)) (repealed 1990). 
145
 Id. at 829-30. 
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 E.g., Dillingham, 519 U.S. at 325. 
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ERISA plans.
147
 Here, the law under review provided that “any 
employer who provides health insurance coverage for an employee 
shall provide health insurance coverage equivalent to the existing 
health insurance coverage of the employee while the employee 
receives or is eligible to receive workers’ compensation benefits under 
this chapter.”
148
 In Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, the state law at 
issue provided employees with a wrongful discharge claim specifically 
when an employer’s desire to avoid making contributions to a pension 
plan is the principal reason for the employee’s termination.
149
 Under 
this state law, the existence of an ERISA pension plan was necessary 




2. “Relates to” an Employee Benefit plan 
The Court first articulated a broad understanding of the phrase 
“relates to” in § 514(a) and its preemptive effect in Shaw v. Delta Air 
Lines, Inc.
151
 The New York statutes in question aimed to establish 
certain rights regarding employees’ healthcare.
152
 New York’s 
“Human Rights Law”, which prohibited employers from structuring 
their employee benefit plans in a manner that discriminated on the 
basis of pregnancy, and New York’s Disability Benefits Law, which 
required employers to pay employees specific benefits, clearly “related 
to” benefit plans.
153
 The Court held that ERISA § 514(a) invalidated 
the New York state statutes requiring employers to pay pregnancy-
related disability benefits on the grounds that such a statute “. . . 
‘relate[s] to’ an employee benefit plan . . . if it has a connection with or 
reference to such a plan.”
154
 
                                                        
147
 506 U.S. at 130-31. 
148
 Id. at 128 (referring to D.C. Code Ann. § 36-307(a-1)(1) (Supp.1992). 
149




 Shaw v. Delta Airlines, 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1983). 
152
 The laws at issue were the state’s Human Rights Law, which forbade 
discrimination in employment, and the state’s Disability Benefits Law, which 
required payment by employers of sick-leave benefits for employees who could 
not work because of non-occupational disabilities. Id. at 88. 
153
 Id. at 96-97. 
154
 Id. at 96-97, 108. 
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In 1995, the Supreme Court narrowed the reach of ERISA’s pre-
emption clause by limiting the types of state laws it considers 
preemptive.
155
 In New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue 
Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co., the Supreme Court upheld a 
New York law imposing a hospital surcharge on all commercial 
insurers except Blue Cross.
156
 The Court held that ERISA did not 
preempt New York’s hospital rate-setting law, even though the 
legislation imposed some costs on ERISA health plans.
157
 The Court 
reasoned that the law would not compel plan administrators to 
structure benefits in a particular way or limit their ability to design 
uniform interstate benefit plans.
158
 The Court noted that “ . . . cost 
uniformity was almost certainly not an object of preemption.”
159
 Here, 
the surcharge was not sufficiently connected to ERISA plans so as to 
“bind plan administrators to any particular choice,” so it would not 
trigger ERISA’s preemption clause.
160
 Although this was not the case 
with the New York law under review, the Court also recognized that a 
state law might impose cost burdens so “exorbitant” that they removed 
any real choice and therefore could be preempted.
161
 
The Travelers Court concluded that state laws that “mandate[] 
employee benefit structures or their administration” are preempted 
under § 514(a) as relating to ERISA-regulated benefit plans.
162
 A state 
law need not explicitly mandate employee benefit structures to be 
preempted by § 514(a). Travelers indicates that a state law is 
preempted by ERISA if that law “produce[s] such acute, albeit 
indirect, economic effects . . . as to force an ERISA plan to adopt a 
certain scheme of substantive coverage.”
163
 However, the twenty-four 
percent hospital surcharge in this case was not sufficiently high 
enough to create an ERISA preemption to the law.
164
 
                                                        
155
 BUTLER, supra note 132, at 4. 
156
 See N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. 
Co., 514 U.S. 645, 645, 668 (1995). 
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 Id. at 647. 
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 Id. at 662. 
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 Id. at 664. 
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 Id. at 658. 
163
 Id. at 668. 
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 Id. 
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The Circuit Courts of Appeal are not uniform in their 
interpretations of ERISA. In Retail Industry Leaders Association v. 
Fielder (RILA), the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit struck 
down a Maryland law requiring Walmart’s employer-sponsored 
healthcare plan to increase contributions and spend at least eight 
percent of its payroll on employee’s health insurance costs, or pay the 
state that amount.
165
 The court held that the state law violated ERISA 
because it left Walmart no real choice but to restructure its employer-
sponsored healthcare plan, either by increasing contributions or by 
paying that money to the state.
166
 Those choices are not 
“. . .meaningful alternatives by which an employer can increase its 
healthcare spending to comply with the [law] without affecting its 
ERISA plan.”
167
 The court held that because the statute would 
effectively have forced employers to restructure their employee health 
insurance plans, it conflicts with ERISA’s goal of permitting uniform 
nationwide administration of these plans.
168
 
However, in Golden Gate Restaurant Association v. City and 
County of San Francisco, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
upheld a San Francisco ordinance requiring employers to make health 
expenditures on behalf of their employees, or make payments to the 
city.
169
 In this case, the court relied on the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Travelers to hold that the ordinance’s influence on the employer’s 
decision was “entirely permissible.”
170
 The court concluded that the 
ordinance offered San Francisco employers a realistic alternative to 
altering their ERISA plans.
171
 Therefore, the spending requirements 
“do not establish an ERISA plan, nor do they have an impermissible 
‘connection with’ employers’ ERISA plans or make an impermissible 
‘reference to’ such plans.”
172
 The court held that the city’s ordinance 
does not act on ERISA plans because it involves only employer 
                                                        
165
 Retail Industry Leaders Association v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180, 200 (4th Cir. 
2007) (hereafter “RILA”). 
166
 Id. at 197. 
167
 Id. at 196. 
168
 Id. at 183. 
169
 Golden Gate Restaurant Association v. City and County of San Francisco, 546 
F.3d 639, 660 (9th Cir. 2009). 
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 Id. at 656. 
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 Id. at 660. 
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 Id. at 661 (internal quotation marks added by the author). 
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spending and not benefits or plan administration.
173
 These two Circuit 
Court of Appeals decisions leave some uncertainty about how the 
lower courts will interpret state laws under ERISA.
174
 
V. POTENTIAL ISSUES FOR § 1332 WAIVERS UNDER ERISA 
Currently, ERISA is not at issue with the ACA’s reforms because 
preemption does not apply to federal laws.
175
 However, concerns about 
ERISA preemption have resurfaced as states begin to consider the 
§ 1332 waiver application process. The Department of Labor (DOL) 
and the Treasury share ERISA jurisdiction; the latter oversees the tax 
administration part of the law, while DOL oversees the fiduciary 
aspects of the law.
176
 In response to public comments requesting 
clarification of the interaction between ERISA and § 1332, the 
Secretaries of CMS, HHS, and DOL responded that while the 
Secretaries have “broad discretion to determine the scope of a waiver, 
no Federal laws or requirements may be waived that are not within the 
Secretaries’ authority.”
177
 Thus, unlike Medicare and Medicaid, 
ERISA is not part of this coordinated waiver process. Without a 
waiver provision, state laws are likely to come into conflict with 
ERISA and the enforceability of their new laws will be subject to 
judicial interpretation. 
A. How the Courts May Interpret New State Laws’ Under 
§ 1332 & ERISA 
Since no court has considered state laws enacted under § 1332, it is 
not possible to predict precisely how a court would view such a 
challenge. The inconsistency in the Circuit Court rulings makes it 
difficult to assess how much latitude a state has under ERISA.
178
 Any 
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alternative state system risks ERISA preemption if it “refers to” or 
“relates to” an employer-based healthcare plan.
179
 Given that each 
state would have its own healthcare reform strategies, ERISA would 
likely preempt any state law on grounds that it limits employers’ 
ability to design uniform interstate benefit plans.
180
 National 
uniformity of benefit plans is a key purpose of ERISA, and disruption 
of that raises significant preemption concerns.
181
 
As outlined in Part IV, in order to comply with the requirements of 
§ 1332, states must propose an alternative system that meets the 
following criteria. The state plan must: 1) provide coverage that is at 
least as comprehensive as the ACA;
182
 2) be at least as affordable as 
the ACA;
183
 3) provide coverage to at least a comparable number of its 
residents as the ACA;
184




In a hypothetical single-payer system, there are at least three 
potential preemption areas for § 1332 under ERISA: (1) mandated 
benefits via minimum coverage requirements; (2) coercion (“pay or 
play”) through payroll taxes; and (3) changes in benefit plan 
administration. 
                                                        
179
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qualified medical expense”). 
184
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1. “Comprehensive” Benefit Plans, e.g. Minimum Benefits 
Packages 
Under the § 1332 waiver, a state must provide coverage at least as 
comprehensive as is offered under the ACA.
186
 As a result, states will 
need statutory mandates to ensure that insurers offer a minimum level 
of health benefits.
187
 This type of provision will likely both “refer to” 
and “relate to” an ERISA plan. Under Travelers, state laws cannot 
specifically mention ERISA plans, and cannot influence benefits, 
administration, or structure under an ERISA plan.
188
 The minimum 
coverage requirements will clearly influence benefits. As the 
concurring judges in Egelhoff v. Egelhoff summarized, “we look both 
to the objectives of the ERISA statute as a guide to the scope of the 
state law that Congress understood would survive, as well as to the 
nature of the effect of the state law on ERISA plans.”
189
 Benefit-




States could argue that they are permitted to regulate benefits 
through ERISA’s “savings clause.” Travelers does indicate that 
“general healthcare regulation” survives ERISA preemption.
191
 The 
Travelers Court cited two examples of general healthcare regulations 
that survive ERISA preemption: hospital “[q]uality control and 
workplace regulation.”
192
 However, since it is unlikely that a benefit 
mandate law could survive judicial scrutiny as either a quality control 
                                                        
186
 See note 67 and sources within. 
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191
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 Id. at 661. 
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measure or workplace regulation, the law will likely be preempted by 
ERISA. 
2. Coercion (“Pay Or Play”) Through a Payroll Tax 
In order to create a single-payer system, states would need to 
institute a payroll or income tax to pay for it. The Vermont plan 
incorporated a payroll tax as the preferred means to raise revenue to 
pay for a single-payer system.
193
 A payroll tax can raise ERISA 
preemption problems because such taxes create incentives for 




The amount of payroll tax that would be required to fund a single-
payer system is not known, but the Hsiao report estimated it would be 
approximately 12.8 to 18.2 percent.
195
 The Court in Travelers 
recognized that a state law might impose cost burdens so “exorbitant” 
that they removed any real choice and therefore could be preempted.
196
 
A 12.8 to 18.2 percent tax is significant and a court would likely find 
this “exorbitant”
197
 under Travelers. Under RILA, the Court found that 
the eight percent payroll tax in that case left employers with a lack of 
“meaningful alternatives by which an employer can increase its 
healthcare spending to comply with the [law] without affecting its 
ERISA plan.”
198
 A law that compels plan administrators to structure 
their benefits in a particular way, especially by forgoing their ERISA 
plans, would be preempted under Travelers.
199
 This restructuring of 
                                                        
193
 The most equitable form of healthcare financing is household income tax. Under 
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employee plans also directly conflicts with ERISA’s goal of permitting 
uniform nationwide administration of these plans.”
200
 
States could defend this approach with several credible arguments. 
For example, both taxation and healthcare financing are exercises of 
traditional state authority that a court should not presume Congress 
intended to preempt under § 514(b).
201
 It could be argued that such a 
state law would not be directed at employer health plan administration, 
since employers would be free to provide coverage to employees even 
if they also were paying the tax. A payroll tax would involve no 
employer role other than remitting the funds.
202
 Furthermore, the 
incidence of a payroll tax on employers actually falls on employees so 
its economic impacts are similar to those of an individual income 
tax.
203
 Despite these arguments, a payroll tax high enough to fund a 
single-payer system would likely be so “exorbitant”
 204
 that a court 
would find the state law preempted by ERISA. 
3. Changes In Plan Administration, e.g. “Single Pipe,” Rate-
Setting 
State innovations under the § 1332 waiver will likely impact plan 
administration. For example, creating a single payment pipe is an 
essential feature of a single-payer plan since it reduces administrative 
waste.
205
 There are also healthcare reform models that propose a 
private-public system that leaves much of the health insurance system 
intact, but aim to save money through a uniform claims administration 
process.
206
 Requiring an ERISA plan to be administered in a specific 
way or through a single processor would likely violate ERISA.
207
 
Under Mackey, a state law “references” an ERISA plan if it had an 
immediate effect on such plans by changing how the plan is 
administered.
208
 Any state law that prescribes a new payment 
                                                        
200
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201
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202




 See Travelers, 514 U.S. at 664. 
205
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206
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methodology would necessarily “refer”
209 
to an ERISA plan.
 
Under the 
expansive Shaw reading of § 514(a) and its “relate to” clause, this type 
of statutory mandate is preempted by ERISA because the mandate 
both “refers to” and has a “connection with” employers’ ERISA-
regulated plans for providing medical care.
210
 A state could argue that 
this is a traditional state regulation under 514(b), but again, as in Part 
V(A)(1) above, under Travelers, it is unlikely that a benefit mandate 




Another change to plan administration would be through rate-
setting. Having a uniform set of mechanisms and rates is typical of a 
single-payer system, and one of the greatest areas for cost savings.
212
 
The rate-setting aspect of a single-payer system is likely to pass legal 
muster. Under Travelers, ERISA would not preempt a state rate-
setting program that established rates for all providers, including 
hospitals, physicians and other providers, as long as it dictates what 
providers must charge rather than what payers must pay.
213
 Both 




In sum, a state law that enacts a single-payer system under a 
§ 1332 waiver will likely be preempted in at least three ways by 
ERISA. The law(s) would be preempted through (1) mandated benefits 
via minimum coverage requirements, (2) coercion (“pay or play”) 




VI.  SOLUTIONS 
As described in Part V, it is likely that ERISA will pose a legal 
roadblock to the enactment of successful state innovation waivers. 
ERISA preemption concerns may prevent states from experimenting 
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 See supra Part V. 
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with health reforms since states may fear expensive litigation. There 
are several solutions to ERISA preemption that may improve the odds 
of success for a § 1332 waiver. Congress could amend or repeal 
ERISA,
216
 or allow for ERISA to be part of the coordinated waiver 
process.
217
 Another solution would be an executive order that would 
address the waiver provision that prevents the Secretary of HHS from 
waiving any law not in HHS’s jurisdiction.
218
 
Since ERISA’s original enactment, Congress has made changes to 
ERISA to remedy certain types of design limitations in employer-
sponsored plans. In the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation 
Act (COBRA) of 1985, Congress required group health plans to 
provide continuation coverage.
219
 COBRA requires that group health 
plans offered by firms with twenty or more employees allow plan 
participants and beneficiaries to elect to continue their coverage under 
group health plans when they experience a qualifying event (e.g., 
worker’s death, unemployment, divorce, attainment of Medicare 
eligibility) that otherwise would result in loss of coverage.
220
 
Similarly, Congress modified ERISA with the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), which restricts 
the use of preexisting condition exclusions and limitations in the group 
market and creates certain coverage portability rights.
221
 HIPAA also 
prohibits ERISA group health plans and health insurance issuers from 
discriminating against any individual in eligibility for coverage, 
enrollment, or premiums based on health-related factors, including: 
health status, medical condition (physical or mental), claims 
experience, receipt of health care, medical history, genetic 
information, evidence of insurability, or disability on the part of 
                                                        
216
 See Christen Young, Pay or Play Programs and ERISA Section 514: Proposals 
for Amending the Statutory Scheme, 10 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 197 
(2010) (describing in detail multiple proposals for amending ERISA). 
217
 42 U.S.C. § 18052 (5) (2012); Waiver for State Innovation, 77 Fed. Reg. 11700, 
11701 (Feb. 27, 2012) (codified at 31 C.F.R. § 33 & 45 C.F.R. § 155 (2012)). 
218
 42 U.S.C. § 18052 (c)(2) (2012); 77 Fed. Reg. 11700, 11702 (Feb. 27, 2012) 
(codified at 31 C.F.R. § 33 & 45 C.F.R. § 155 (2012)). 
219
 Public Law No. 99-272 was enacted on April 7, 1986. The COBRA continuation 
rules were generally applicable to group health plans for plan years beginning on 
or after July 1, 1986, but this effective date was delayed for certain collectively 
bargained plans. 
220
 ERISA §§ 601-08; 29 U.S.C. §§ 1161-68 (2012). 
221
 ERISA §§ 701-07; 29 U.S.C. §§ 1181-83 (2012). 
2015 Is ERISA a Roadblock to Meaningful Healthcare Reform? 423 
enrollees or their dependents.
222
 Additionally, Congress has adopted a 
modest range of benefit mandates applicable to ERISA group health 
plans, including limited coverage of vaccines for children, a minimum 
length of stay for maternity coverage on newborn children, limited 
parity in mental health benefits, and certain medical and reconstructive 
benefits for participants who have undergone mastectomies.
223
 
These mandates all occurred at the federal level, but Congress 
could amend § 514(a) to allow states to adopt legislation that would 
allow for innovations that include employer-provided health insurance 
plans. Legislation could specifically state that health reforms under 
§ 1332 will not be preempted by ERISA. However, there would likely 
be significant opposition to ERISA amendment or waivers. If 
preemption supporters saw a real threat to the provision, they would 
undoubtedly lobby against it.
224 
As mentioned in Part IV, the § 1332 waiver prevents CMS, HHS, 
and the Treasury from waiving any law that is not in its jurisdiction.
225
 
One possibility to circumvent this limitation in authority would be an 
executive order that allows for CMS, HHS, the Treasury, and DOL to 
work jointly to issue a waiver provision. The President could issue an 
order that would allow for a state to get a waiver under the ACA that 
would include a limited waiver from ERISA. Another solution is to 
                                                        
222
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permit states to apply for a specific ERISA waiver. Congress could 
pave the way for states to file an application with DOL as a part of the 
§ 1332 coordinated waiver process. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
It is difficult to envision significant state experimentation with 
health reform that is not vulnerable to ERISA preemption. ERISA 
preemption concerns will not prevent states from experimenting with 
insurance regulation or with healthcare reforms outside of the 
employment context. However, as long as states cannot include 
members of the population with employer-based health insurance, they 
cannot optimize innovations under the ACA. 
Pursuant to § 514(a) and the controlling case law, a single-payer 
system and many other creative state level innovations under § 1332 
appear threatened by ERISA preemption. Particular areas of concern 
include the ACA’s requirements that states must provide minimum 
benefits packages, the coercive nature of a potential payroll tax and the 
necessary changes in plan administration.
226
 These requirements are 
likely to “refer to” or “relate to” an ERISA plan, and therefore will be 
preempted.
227
 States may argue that they are operating in an area of 
traditional regulatory authority, but judicial precedent is not in their 
favor.
228
 Even if a state could successfully make this argument, those 
covered by employer-sponsored self-insured plans would most 
certainly remain out of reach to state innovations. Without changes to 
ERISA, or to the waiver process, § 1332 State Innovation Waivers will 
be limited to health reforms that exclude the majority of the 
population. Unless Congress or the President act, the ACA will fail in 
its goal to fully engage the states as “laboratories of experiment”
229
 in 
the area of healthcare. 
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